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liarity of the country. The chief law of imitation is that its influence passes from superiors to inferiors. Hence, the action of aristocracies; hence also that of capitals and large towns. "However strange it may appear, there are serious reasons for affirming that the vice and crime localized to-day in the lowest ranks of society have descended from the upper classes." Again, "one may now see how crime is propagated from large towns to the country, from the capital to the provinces, and how capitals and large towns exercise an irresistible attraction on countrymen and provincials who have lost caste or fallen into vice, and who hasten thither to get civilized after their fashion, a new method of raising themselves in the social scale." Also while contrasting urban and rural criminality, the author observes that the second tends more and more to resemble the first, and to become confounded with it. Here may be found considerations most worthy of attention, upon the evolutionary changes of that form of criminality which, proud, vindictive, and passionate as it originally was, has assumed a more and more voluptuous, calculating, and covetous character. The same tendency is again met with in art and industry, and from the same general causes, "which in every social order have caused in civilized as compared with barbarous man the predominance of calculation over passion, of the wish for comfort over pride."

The application of the sociological method revives in the same way the question of trial and evidence in criminal affairs: it shows that the "*trial by ordeal*" (the judicial duel), torture, trial by jury, arbitration, are the successive links in one and the same chain, substituted one for another by the all powerful action of imitation, first fashion, then custom. We must call attention to a very forcible criticism on the institution of juries, and the proposed reforms for replacing them (the creation of a criminal magistracy absolutely distinct from the civil magistracy, and of scientific inquests). But we must stop, for, at almost every page of this book, new questions crop up, new ideas, to which full justice could not be done without trespassing on our limited space. One might almost say that the greatest fault of the book is that it is too rich in thought; but, of all faults, this is certainly the rarest and the easiest to forgive.

E. BOIRAC.

AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY. By J. S. Mackenzie. Glasgow: J. Maclehose & Sons.

Perhaps one chief reason why there are so few professed students of social philosophy is that even among highly-educated people, taking the ordinary acceptation of that term, very few are convinced there is such a thing as social philosophy, and fewer still have any clear notion what it is. While this fact gives a peculiar value to a work like Mr. Mackenzie's as a satisfaction of a want which ought to be a need, it imposes upon the writer a duty from which writers of text-books upon most studies are comparatively free,—that of claiming, and even to some extent of reclaiming, from neighboring realms of science the territory which it can establish as its rightful domain. It may be said at once that Mr. Mackenzie, in the opening chapter of his remarkable book, has shown great skill and metaphysical tact in this delicate operation of tracing the bearings of social philosophy to the bordering subjects of ethics, politics, and economics,

and in making good its claim to the title philosophy. One of the chief merits of the chapter consists in the frank, repeated admission that precise definition is impossible, that there exist no real boundary-lines between such studies, each of which intrudes upon the others, with varying degrees of pressure, at innumerable points. So, too, he brings out fearlessly that which is often deemed a reproach against philosophy, but which is, in truth, her special intellectual badge and character,—the sense of incompleteness, the “unsatisfying” feeling which attends the closest and fullest study. “For philosophy, as we have already said, is the serpent of eternity, and within its circle there can be neither beginning nor conclusion, except the idea of a system which is both; any other beginning and any other conclusion must be wrong. The true philosopher will know that the truth of philosophy is not a truth which is grasped, but a truth which is an inspiring ideal,—an ideal which shows through at every point in the growth of our knowledge, but which can never be perfectly grasped till the system of the universe is seen in its completeness.” (P. 35.)

A social philosophy necessitates an ideal of social unity. To give clearness to this ideal as a true motive-force of history is the most important part of Mr. Mackenzie’s work. He shows that of the four ideals of social life which present themselves as possible in social evolution, the “organic” is the one towards which we are now advancing. The organic view stands not as a compromise, but as a logical mean between the “monadistic” view, commonly known as “individualism,” and the “monistic” view, which is “communism.” “The organic view is that which regards the rights of the individual as inseparable from his obligations to his society, and his obligations as equally inseparable from his rights,—each being but a different aspect of the demands of his nature from him as a being who cannot but be social.” (P. 134.)

This distinction is of prime importance, and marks the clear, philosophical conception which gives value to Mr. Mackenzie’s treatment, the idea that in social progress neither logical nor historical priority is to be conceded to the individual or to the state, but that the growth of the individual is one with that of his society, as the branch of a tree with that of the stem. But, though Mr. Mackenzie gives a convincing justification of his use of the term “organic” as applied to social growth, he is careful to protect himself from errors likely to arise from the exclusively physiological associations of the term he employs. Against the danger of too rigorous definition, I have said, Mr. Mackenzie is generally well on his guard. In his excellent examination of “mechanical” and “organic” unity, he is wise to insist upon the fact that “there is no sharp line of separation between the various forms of unity.”

In his extremely valuable chapter upon “The Social Ideal,” Mr. Mackenzie devotes some of his best thought to a consideration of the difficulties and dangers of socialism. This is not, however, because he is opposed to the gradual strengthening of social bonds, but rather because he clearly reads the forces of the age as making towards this socialism, and rightly considers it more urgent that we should investigate the barriers and pitfalls which are on our actual historic line of progress than those which would beset us if we were moving towards some other goal, such as the “monadistic” goal of Mr. Auberon Herbert.

To say that Mr. Mackenzie wields easily, almost gayly, a great weight of learning, is to indicate one of the minor merits of this truly remarkable book. He has collected and put in his chapters much of the best that has been thought and said by others upon the many topics which come under his survey. But, though he quotes wisely and often, his quotations by no means usurp the place of plums in a philosophic pudding. Many of Mr. Mackenzie's own sentences will compare, for condensed force and brilliancy of literary setting, with many of the best he quotes. But these epigrams are not used, as is too often the case, to shirk criticism by hiding rifts in the process of argument. "The proper place of wit and epigram is in illustration or summary of arguments already given." Mr. Mackenzie, especially in the opening chapters of his work, pursues his task of denunciation with a bare, relentless severity of logic which can only be enjoyed by those who recognize the urgent need for this close knife-play of metaphysics.

Mr. Mackenzie appears to me amply justified, in his later chapters, in passing a little beyond the strict limits assigned to social philosophy in Chapter I. A bare statement of principles, however accurate, would hardly suffice in a study whose definition from other studies is so difficult. Hence a frequent descent into the region of particular illustrations is required to mark the true, substantial contents of the subject, as well as to indicate its bearings with regard to the surrounding regions of ethics, politics, and economics.

Thus, the long discussion entitled "The Elements of Social Progress" cannot be regarded as a mere appendage, but as an integral part of a scheme of study in social philosophy. Dealing with the perfection of social machinery and personal development, Mr. Mackenzie does not attempt to adequately discuss the problems of co-operation and profit-sharing, the population question, discriminate charity, and forms of government and education. He is concerned only to set these various and intricate problems in the light afforded by the social philosophy he has introduced, in order to see them in the order and proportion which they so sadly lack as they are thrust upon us in the hap-hazard of ordinary reading. But in briefly touching these subjects he makes some extremely suggestive remarks. Two, at least, bearing upon education, deserve quotation. In speaking of the personal services of man to man as one of the necessities of the moral life, he says, "It is in such instances as this that we are made aware that the moral life is the most subtle and exquisite of the fine arts and requires a genius for its right accomplishment,"—an admirable illustration of the merging in the highest point of moral life of those two forms of the ideal called the good and the beautiful, which on a lower level of life may seem so widely divergent. The other remark is a "practical" criticism upon the blindness of the higher education of our country. Speaking of the English universities, Mr. Mackenzie remarks, "What naturally concerns the social philosopher most deeply is the absence of any adequate recognition of the study of social science, including economics, politics, and the theory of education." (P. 357.)

It is, indeed, not unnatural that, beginning his discussion of social progress with a setting of industrial problems, he should end with a statement of educational aims and needs, for education is nothing less than character in working, the process of self-realization in the individual as in the state.

An adequate survey of so large and important a work is here impossible. It must suffice to say that Mr. Mackenzie has approached his subject along that road of idealism by which alone it is accessible, and that he has given the clearest, brightest, and soundest exposition accessible to English students. Finally, there is no trace in Mr. Mackenzie's work of that spirit of "academicism" which withers the life out of many of the subtlest intelligences bred in our universities, the spirit which is always balancing to produce an equipoise, afraid lest strong judgment should be mistaken for rashness or partiality, and who, removed from the stress and strain of practical life, necessary for good philosophy as for all other human work, cultivate in its place a holy calm of philosophic indifference, which allows no good works to issue.

JOHN A. HOBSON.

A PLEA FOR LIBERTY. Edited by Thomas Mackay. Second Edition. London: John Murray, 1891.

The feelings of satisfaction which this book on the whole inspires cannot be said to be unmixed. It makes out, no doubt, a heavy case against Socialism and excessive Collectivism. But in several places the reader feels that more might have been made of the position, and that the victory is due to the weakness of the adversary, more than to good strategy on the part of the individualist leaders.

This volume consists of thirteen essays of very varying merits. Mr. Herbert Spencer contributes an introduction, written with his usual clearness and brilliancy. It admits frankly the evils which at present beset competitive industry, and makes its chief point out of the increased slavery which a Socialistic system would involve for the worker. Mr. Spencer predicts a tyrannous bureaucracy, and points to the complaints already made in trade-unions to this effect. (The great tendency of democracies to distrust their leaders may perhaps lead us to doubt if these complaints mean much.) The common objection has been the reverse of Mr. Spencer's,—that a democratic Socialism would not leave enough freedom to the captains of industry. The path runs, in fact, between the two dangers, and any deviation on either side would be almost sure to be disastrous.

Mr. Robertson on the Impracticability of Socialism is clear, but not very original. It might have been better if he could have found room for some demonstration that Socialism was not only impracticable but unnecessary. One of the strongest weapons of Socialism is its cry that the rich are growing richer and the poor poorer, and a summary of Mr. Giffen's telling statistics on this point seems wanted to complete the consideration of the question. The doctrine of distribution according to "social labor times," which Mr. Robertson attacks, quoting it from Schäffle's "Quintessence," is now, we believe, abandoned by the leading English Socialists.

Mr. Donisthorpe's article on the Limits of Liberty is, perhaps, the most interesting piece of work in the book. His attempt to prove inductively the law that state interference tends to decrease in extensivity and increase in intensity is thoughtful and forcible. He wisely rejects the tempting, but dangerous, attempt to find some general formula which will limit the functions of the state, and works *a posteriori* with very interesting results.